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Comment  Gianmarco I. P. Ottaviano
A decade after the introduction of the euro, studies of the eﬀects of the euro 
on real and ﬁ  nancial variables are ﬂ  ourishing. A couple of years ago, the 
state of the debate was summarized by The Economist (2006) as follows: “In 
the continuing controversies about Europe’s bold experiment in monetary 
union, there has at least been some agreement about where the costs and 
beneﬁ  ts lie. The costs are macroeconomic, caused by forgoing the right to 
set interest rates to suit the speciﬁ  c economic conditions of a member state. 
The beneﬁ  ts are microeconomic, consisting of potential gains in trade and 
growth as the costs of changing currencies and exchange-  rate uncertainty 
are removed.”
Against this background, Bugamelli, Schivardi, and Zizza consider a 
speciﬁ  c aspect of the cost-  beneﬁ  t trade-  oﬀ by looking at the “macro cost” 
of renouncing to competitive devaluations and the “micro beneﬁ  t” due to 
productivity gains through ﬁ  rm restructuring once the competitive boost of 
devaluations within the euro area has been removed.
Even though the recent ﬁ  nancial turmoil has someway stressed also the 
existence of potentially relevant macroeconomic beneﬁ  ts, the authors’ eﬀort 
remains worthwhile, given that the quantiﬁ  cation of the microeconomic 
eﬀects of the euro is still at an infant stage, mainly due to the lack of quality 
data at the ﬁ  rm level for several European countries.
In their eﬀort, the key challenge the authors face is how to disentangle 
confounding factors, as there are several measurable microeconomic eﬀects 
that the euro may have had. In particular, the literature has highlighted 
three main categories of microeconomic eﬀects stemming from the reduc-
tion of several types of transaction costs. First, there are the eﬀects on trade 
ﬂ  ows. Through the export participation eﬀect, some ﬁ  rms that were for-
merly unable to export become active in international markets. Through 
the market coverage eﬀect, exporters start to serve a larger number of for-
eign countries. Through the product variety eﬀects, exporters start to sell a 
larger number of products in foreign markets. Through the export intensity 
eﬀect, exporters increase the sales of each product in each foreign market in 
which it is sold. Second, there are the eﬀects on prices. Through the (pure) 
transaction cost eﬀect, a fall in the costs associated with exporting activi-
ties directly translates in lower export prices. Through the procompetitive 
eﬀect, increased arbitrage opportunities for customers, which are due to 
lower transaction costs, force ﬁ  rms to reduce their markups and limit their 
ability to extract value by quoting diﬀerent prices in diﬀerent countries (the 
so- called “pricing to market”). This maps into lower export price levels and 
lower price dispersion across national markets. Third and last, there are the 
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eﬀects on ﬁ  rm performance. Through intraindustry reallocations, tougher 
competition forces less-  eﬃcient ﬁ  rms to exit (selection). Through intraﬁ  rm 
reallocations, tougher competition forces surviving ﬁ  rms to restructure 
(restructuring). Hence, even when observed in the data, restructuring, which 
is the focus of the authors’ investigation, may have nothing to do with having 
foregone the right to devaluate.
The challenge becomes even tougher when one considers that several of 
the foregoing eﬀects are not speciﬁ  c to the introduction of the common 
currency but may be the result of other parallel events, such as the broader 
process of European integration or globalization at large. Hence, restructur-
ing may not only have little to do with the foregone possibility of competitive 
devaluations but also with the euro altogether.
Unfortunately, all these confounding factors are not discussed in the 
chapter, which to many readers may cast a methodological shadow on the 
authors’ identiﬁ  cation strategy of the restructuring eﬀects of foregone com-
petitive devaluations. Such strategy is based on treatment-  versus-  control 
comparisons aimed at identifying the diﬀerential impact of the euro between 
otherwise identical groups. These groups are deﬁ  ned along three dimen-
sions: EU countries inside or outside the euro area, sectors in which devalu-
ations were more or less important for competitiveness before the euro, and 
low-   or high-  tech ﬁ  rms. The author’s basic idea is: “If the euro has had any 
eﬀect in terms of restructuring, we expect it to be strongest in the country-
  sectors that relied more intensively on competitive devaluations”—that is, 
in countries that were formerly keener to devaluate and in sectors where 
competition is mainly in terms of prices, as in these sectors, devaluations 
were more likely to aﬀect competitiveness.
For many readers, it may be hard to see how this treatment- versus- control 
strategy allows the authors to isolate the speciﬁ  c eﬀects of the euro in terms 
of foregone devaluations from its eﬀects in terms of lower transaction costs, 
and to some extent, from the eﬀects of other parallel events. For instance, 
aren’t the country-  sector-  ﬁ  rms in which the authors look for the eﬀects of 
foregone devaluations the same in which one would expect the impact of 
lower transaction costs to be stronger? Aren’t such country- sector- ﬁ  rms pre-
cisely those in which one would expect growing competition from emerging 
countries from outside the European Union? Isn’t it possible that the “clear 
break around the 1992 devaluation” has something to do with the single 
market rather than with the devaluation per se?
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